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THE ISSUE 
Mitigating greenhouse gas emissions is more difficult in some countries than in others. 
International emissions trading can help to reduce the overall cost of mitigation and 
ensure that companies in different countries face the same carbon price. Lower costs and 
tackling competitiveness concerns can enable higher levels of climate ambition. The Paris 
Agreement explicitly provides for international emissions trading, but the rules governing 
trading still need to be determined. In the absence of strict rules, international emissions 
trading might become a loophole leading to reduced climate ambition. And because of its 
consensus requirements, the United Nations process is unlikely to lead to comprehensive 
rules. To fill this gap, the European Union should engage with other nations to determine a 
set of rules that can serve as a gold standard for emissions trading anywhere in the world.
POLICY CHALLENGE 
The effort to define rules for international emissions trading faces the strong desire of 
nation states to develop their own climate policies, which collides with the need for 
tradable units in one country to be equivalent to tradable units in another country. To 
overcome this dilemma we propose a club of carbon-buying countries that would regu-
late only imported mitigation outcomes. We propose that private parties would be able, 
if permitted by the participating governments, to transfer any type of privately tradable 
emissions reduction unit across borders. But they would also be liable if the foreign 
units do not represent sufficient mitigation in the selling county. To bridge the period 
before final settlement, private parties would be able to borrow domestic compliance 
units, based on collateralising a certain amount of foreign units.
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THE 2015 PARIS AGREEMENT marked a 
shift in the international climate policy 
architecture. While the Kyoto Protocol 
established binding targets for a num-
ber of countries, the Paris Agreement 
allows countries to commit to self-set 
targets and policies to limit greenhouse 
gas emissions. This has resulted in 
fragmentation¹. The European Union in 
its Nationally Determined Contribution 
(NDC), for example, committed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent 
by 2030 compared to 1990, while the 
United States intends by 2025 to reduce 
emissions by 26-28 percent below their 
2005 level. In contrast, China does not 
directly commit to a fixed limit, but has 
four indirect targets: (1) peaking of emis-
sions by 2030; (2) a 60 percent reduction 
in emissions per unit of GDP compared 
to 2005; (3) reducing the share of fossil 
fuels in primary energy consumption to 
80 percent; and (4) increasing the forest 
stock compared to 2005. 
Because of this fragmented approach, 
a company in one country might 
face very different emissions-related 
costs to a similar company in another 
country. Some very expensive emissions 
reductions will be pursued, while 
much cheaper options in other sectors/
countries remain unused. This would be 
economically inefficient, and might also 
weaken compliance when policymakers 
realise that their domestic industries 
face significantly higher emissions costs 
than foreign competitors. In principle, 
making emissions reductions tradable 
between countries should ensure that the 
cheapest mitigation options are pursued 
first, irrespective of where they are found. 
This would reduce the global mitigation 
cost and result in a harmonisation of 
company-level mitigation costs, which 
in turn could reduce the fear of national 
competitiveness loss resulting from 
decarbonisation.
Lower mitigation costs (Box 1 on the 
next page) through the international 
trading of emissions mitigation outcomes 
would also increase the transparency of 
national abatement policies and could 
stimulate the sharing of good practice. In 
addition, countries – typically developing 
countries – that can generate cash flows 
from selling mitigation outcomes might 
feel more bound by the Paris Agreement. 
And those countries that can cut their 
abatement costs by buying foreign 
mitigation outcomes might be more 
willing to increase their commitments. 
Furthermore, the option to trade in 
mitigation outcomes makes it more 
credible that countries will meet their 
commitments, even if external shocks 
increase some countries’ emissions². 
International emissions trading is 
explicitly permitted by Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement. The corresponding 
provisions are much more flexible 
than under the Kyoto Protocol. While a 
set of so-called “flexible mechanisms” 
was detailed in the Kyoto Protocol, 
governments will be relatively free to 
design new mechanisms under the 
Paris Agreement as long as they follow 
some general principles (eg accounting 
guidance to avoid double counting)³. This 
flexibility given by the Paris Agreement 
calls for a new way of structuring 
emissions trading, in which countries 
can offer low-cost mitigation outcomes 
to willing buyers. The European Union 
could take the lead.
A CARBON CLUB
The EU should – together with other 
ambitious nations – form a voluntary 
club of countries that determine their 
own emissions trading rules. This is 
crucial because the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change process – in which decisions 
need to be taken by consensus⁴ – is 
unlikely to come up with stringent rules. 
The differences between ambitious and 
less ambitious, developed and less-
developed, potential net-buyer and 
potential net-seller countries would likely 
result in a watered-down compromise. 
Furthermore, a few countries that try to 
achieve disproportionate benefits could 
stall the process. This is especially true at 
a time when the US is less likely to throw 
its political weight into climate-related 
negotiations.
In the absence of specific universal 
rules on international emissions trading, 
each country can essentially determine 
1. We can identify three types 
of NDC: (1) ‘Absolute’ 
type, such as the EU’s, with 
a fixed absolute econo-
my-wide emission reduc-
tion target; (2) ‘Intensity’ 
type, ie the government 
plans to move to a certain 
level of emissions relative 
to GDP; (3) ‘Other’ type, 
with no explicit emissions 
reduction goal.
2. The alternative would be 
that, to avoid risks, coun-
tries either engage in lower 
commitments upfront 
or there is a mechanism 
for exceptions from com-
pliance in extraordinary 
situations. But given, for 
example, the experience 
with the EU Stability and 
Growth Pact, such mech-
anisms can easily become 
politicised and open the 
door for non-compliance 
for everyone.
3. For a thorough discussion 
of potential implications 
of Article 6 (on emissions 
trading) see Marcu (2016).
4. There is a legal discussion 
on whether the ad-hoc 
consensus rule currently 
applied (for lack of  con-
sensus on rules of proce-
dure) implies a veto power 
for each country. See Vogel 
(2014).
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5. Quantification of the Paris 
pledges compared to the 
current policy projections 
from 2014 implies the fol-
lowing abatement pledges: 
China: 13.6 instead of 15 
GtCO2e (gigatonnes of 
equivalent carbon dioxide) 
in 2030 -> 1.4 Gt of miti-
gation; US: 5.6 instead of 7 
GtCO2e in 2030 -> 1.4 Gt of 
mitigation; EU: 3.5 instead 
of 4 GtCO2e in 2030 -> 0.5 
Gt of mitigation.
6. We do not use the original 
abatement cost curves, but 
approximation described 
in Cline (2011).
Box 1: The potential benefits of trading mitigation outcomes
Different countries face different costs to reduce emissions. Some countries can reduce 
emissions substantially by using energy more efficiently at very low additional cost. Other 
countries might be already more efficient and hence their cheapest option is to switch 
from coal to gas. To reduce emissions further, countries will have to start to replace fossil 
fuels in electricity generation, heating and transport. The profile of how much a country 
can reduce emissions at a certain cost is its so-called ‘marginal abatement cost curve’. 
From countries’ abatement cost curves and their emissions reduction commitments (the 
red lines in Figure 1), the minimum cost to achieve these commitments can be calcu-
lated. For example, in Figure 1, the EU would reduce its first emissions unit at a cost of 2 
and the second at a cost of 6, for a total abatement cost of 8.
If the countries in Figure 1 decided to reduce emissions jointly, they would have to re-
duce total emissions by the sum of their commitments (say, 5 units). It would make sense 
that emissions are reduced first where those reductions are cheapest. As some expensive 
mitigation (such as the EU reducing one unit of emissions at a cost of 6) would no longer 
be necessary to meet the reduction target, the total cost of joint action (12) is much lower 
than the sum of the cost when each country acts individually (16).
Figure 1: Illustration of the gains from emissions trading
 
The potential benefits from trading mitigation outcomes can be calculated based on the 
national commitments and the estimated abatement cost curves for the three regions in 
our example (the EU, China and the US). For the national commitments we used a quan-
tification of the EU, Chinese and US NDCs by climateactiontracker (2016)⁵. For the abate-
ment cost curves, very different estimates have been proposed. Accordingly, the estimat-
ed gains from trade vary widely when using the McKinsey cost curves (11 percent saving 
from emission trading compared to meeting the NDCs domestically), the curves em-
ployed by the 22nd Stanford Energy Modelling Forum (21 percent) and the curves from 
Nordhaus’ RICE model (49 percent)⁶. Under all assumptions on abatement cost curves, 
the gains from trading mitigation outcomes are substantial and abatement is shifted from 
the EU and the US, which have consistently higher abatement costs, to China.
Re
du
ct
io
n 
co
st
 p
er
 u
ni
t
Reduction
Cost=4 R
ed
uc
tio
n 
co
st
 p
er
 u
ni
t
Reduction
Cost=8
Re
du
ct
io
n 
co
st
 p
er
 u
ni
t
Reduction
Cost=4
Re
du
ct
io
n 
co
st
 p
er
 u
ni
t
Reduction
Cost=12
China EU
United States
Jointly
POLICY BRIEF  THE CARBON BUYERS’ CLUB 4
at national level which foreign carbon 
trading partners and carbon units to 
accept and how to account for them. 
Because of the lack of clarity about 
what emissions trading activities would 
comply with Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement, a race to the bottom in 
terms of the rigour of bilateral emissions 
trading might emerge. Sellers might offer 
emissions units that do not correspond 
to additional emissions reductions, and 
buyers might knowingly accept them 
because they are cheaper or because 
they want to support the selling country. 
Because emissions trading is complex, 
it would be very difficult to draw a line 
determining what is acceptable.
A rigorous reference ruleset 
determined by a group of countries 
would therefore be very valuable. 
Countries committed to this ruleset 
would benefit from a liquid and 
predictable emissions trading scheme, 
that meets (and in fact defines) the 
international standards. Countries 
that accept less-rigorous rules for 
international emissions trading would 
then have to explain how they ensure 
the general provisions of the Paris 
Agreement.
A ‘gold standard’ of emissions trading 
established by a club of countries should 
meet four criteria: 
•  The members must together amount 
to a critical mass in terms of share of 
global GDP, population and emissions. 
•  They must all share an interest in a 
rigorous emissions trading system.
•  They must be open to welcome new 
members (otherwise they would have 
no legitimacy in terms of developing 
rules that would become a global 
reference).
• They should start out with a proposal 
that is rigorous but that also allows 
members to pursue sovereign 
decisions on their national emissions 
reduction policies.
A BUYERS’ CLUB
The carbon club will need to decide as a 
first priority which areas its rules will reg-
ulate. At one extreme, the club could seek 
to set up a common emissions trading 
scheme. However, like the EU’s emissions 
trading system, this would necessarily 
deeply impinge on national sovereign-
ty; otherwise, unilateral policies in one 
country (eg weak emissions monitoring) 
could have undesired effects in another 
country. Such a harmonised approach is 
highly unlikely to be politically accept-
able to a wider group of countries. At 
the other extreme, the club could only 
set very general rules that translate the 
sometimes vague provisions of Article 6 
of the Paris Agreement into more con-
crete language. But that would mean 
that countries would still need to define 
the products and trading mechanisms 
they would like to use separately. The 
value added would consequently be very 
limited.
As a middle way, we would propose 
that the club determines rules on 
importing foreign mitigation outcomes. 
Thereby, the club would not constitute a 
single buyer, but would only determine 
joint rules on how foreign mitigation 
outcomes are monitored, transferred to 
and accounted for by the buyer country 
(Figure 2). If the club of countries is large 
enough in terms of economic weight, the 
rules on how emissions reductions are 
imported will, however, determine which 
types of emissions reductions are offered.
Figure 2: A carbon buyers’ club
PRIVATE TRADING
In an international system, mitigation 
outcomes could be traded between gov-
ernments (similarly to Assigned Amount 
Units under the Kyoto Protocol) or be-
Carbon buyers’ club
Other UNFCCC member country
Carbon club member country
Transactions in line with
UNFCCC rules
Transactions in line with the
stricter Carbon club rules
“Because of the lack 
of clarity about what 
emissions trading 
activities would 
comply with the 
Paris Agreement, a 
race to the bottom 
in terms of the 
rigour of bilateral 
emissions trading 
might emerge”
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7. Similar to Certified Emis-
sion Reductions from the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism.
8. Note this gives the buyer 
countries the last say on 
which trading partners they 
accept, even though they 
are members of the club.
9. Obviously only units that at 
least one member country 
of the club accepts for do-
mestic compliance should 
be evaluated.
tween private parties (similarly to emis-
sions allowances from the EU emissions 
trading system). Our proposal focuses on 
exchanges between private parties, but 
the general accounting rules should also 
be relevant for intergovernmental trans-
fers of mitigation outcomes.
In our proposal, each country can 
have its own emissions reduction 
policies. Some might entail privately 
tradable emissions reduction units 
such as credits for certain projects⁷, 
emissions allowances from domestic 
emissions trading systems, removal 
units for investments in carbon sinks or 
even renewables or energy efficiency 
certificates that imply greenhouse gas 
reductions. These units could be very 
different in their characteristics, and the 
rules governing their issuance, transfer, 
accounting and monitoring would be 
nationally determined (for example, units 
could include still existing Kyoto Protocol 
units, units from emissions trading 
systems, possible future units relating to 
afforestation and other projects).
To safeguard national sovereignty, 
each international exchange of privately 
tradable emissions reduction units would 
require the permission of the concerned 
governments. In other words, if a selling 
country allows the export of units and a 
buyer country allows the units to be used 
for domestic compliance under certain 
conditions, private parties in those 
countries can trade in them⁸. 
BUYER BEWARE
Accepting any type of foreign emissions 
reduction unit at face value into the do-
mestic system can easily lead to inflation. 
For example, the 1.4 billion international 
units accepted into the EU ETS before 
2014 raised the cap of the EU ETS, even 
though they did not correspond to the 
claimed additional emission reductions. 
Global emissions likely increased as a 
result of the acceptance into the ETS 
of the international units. Thus foreign 
units should be accounted for in the 
buyer country according to their ‘mit-
igation value’ and not their face value. 
The mitigation value related to a certain 
emissions reduction unit from the seller’s 
country would be the amount of green-
house gases removed (eg one tonne of 
carbon dioxide equivalent) by not using 
the unit for compliance in the seller’s 
country. This mitigation value can only 
be determined after some time (see next 
section). A definitive exchange rate be-
tween a certain type of unit in the selling 
country and another type of unit in the 
buyer country cannot be determined in 
real time.
To address the variable and 
unconfirmed quality of foreign emission 
reduction units, the core principle of 
our proposal is to make private buyers 
responsible for the mitigation value of 
the units they purchase. That is, private 
buyers are liable if the foreign mitigation 
outcome unit they surrender in their 
country has a lower mitigation value than 
claimed. This would give private buyers 
the right incentive to search for units 
with the likely greatest and most certain 
mitigation value and the lowest cost. 
SELLER SYSTEMS ARE EVALUATED
At one point, the buyer of a foreign 
emissions reduction unit must be able 
to use its mitigation value for compli-
ance in the buyer country’s system. This 
requires a definitive evaluation of the 
mitigation value of the foreign unit. We 
suggest that the five-year global stock-
take envisaged in Article 14 of the Paris 
Agreement would be a natural date for 
this evaluation at which one consensus 
mitigation value (that all members of the 
club accept) is assigned to each privately 
tradable emissions reduction unit⁹. The 
evaluation methodology and the (inde-
pendent) evaluating institution would 
need to be determined ex ante by the 
club. We see top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to determining mitigation 
values.
The top-down approach would rest 
solely on the compliance of the selling 
country with its NDC. If it emits more 
than envisaged under its NDC, all units 
it sold would be considered worthless 
(have a mitigation value of zero). If it 
keeps emissions below its target, the 
mitigation value of the exported units 
would equal the emission reduction 
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compared to the NDC divided by the 
number of exported units. That is, if a 
country reduces emissions by 100 million 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent more than 
foreseen under the NDC, having exported 
200 million privately tradable emission 
reduction units, each of those units has 
a mitigation value of 0.5 tonnes of CO2 
equivalent. We see three problems with 
this approach: 1) emissions are strongly 
driven by exogenous factors such as 
economic growth and energy prices 
so that foreign units might become a 
speculation instrument with limited 
additionality; 2) it would give countries 
a strong incentive to understate their 
emissions reduction intentions so 
that they would be able to show a high 
mitigation value for exported units; and 
3) that countries once they likely emit 
more than their target will not be able to 
attract foreign investment for emissions 
reduction projects financed through 
international emissions trading.
The bottom-up approach would focus 
on the emissions reductions generated 
through the individual mitigation 
unit issuing systems (eg a sectoral 
emissions trading system or a crediting 
mechanism) in the selling country. The 
emissions reductions would need to be 
compared to a synthetic benchmark. 
The more transparent a country is 
about the scheme – and its intended 
reduction effect – the more easily it 
could be evaluated¹⁰. The drawback of 
this approach, however, is that selling 
countries could have an incentive to 
bundle ‘cheap’ mitigation options into 
one scheme in order to export the 
corresponding units. Then a country 
might fall short of its NDC promises but 
still export a lot of units.
One solution could be to determine 
the mitigation value through a com-
bination of the two systems, combin-
ing bottom-up (evaluate each system 
individually) and top-down (evaluate the 
entire country performance). The sim-
plest, but possibly not the best, approach 
would be to multiply the individual 
system’s mitigation value (eg 0.8 tonnes 
of CO2 equivalent) by a country-wide 
NDC-compliance factor (eg 90 percent, 
should the country achieve 90 percent of 
the aims stated in its NDC) to obtain the 
final mitigation value (eg 0.72 tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent).
NATIONAL FUNDS AS 
INTERMEDIARIES
Under the system we have described, for-
eign units would trade at a high discount 
because their true value would only be 
determined after the global stocktake 
and they would not be valid for compli-
ance in the buyer country before that. To 
resolve this, the second core element of 
our proposal is that individual countries 
(or several countries jointly) should set 
up national/multinational funds. These 
funds would accept foreign units as col-
lateral and lend buyer country compli-
ance units¹¹, ie foreign units would never 
be directly used for compliance, but 
would need to be exchanged into domes-
tic units first¹². The collateral requirement 
for each foreign unit would be informed 
by private or public rating agencies. This 
would send a continuous signal to private 
buyers and the selling country. If the 
selling country’s system for generating 
units is politically, legally or economical-
ly undermined, the corresponding units 
would lose value – which should give an 
incentive to selling countries to recali-
brate their systems. 
The funds would be crucial because 
they would enable the private buyers 
(and the buyer countries) to be made 
responsible for the quality of the 
purchased mitigation outcomes. Until 
the ultimate exchange of selling-country 
units into buyer-country units, the 
private buyer would only own the selling-
country units and would be therefore 
liable for their quality. At the same time 
the private buyer would borrow buyer-
country units from the fund (in the buyer 
country), which is would be a second 
line of defence in case the private buyer 
becomes overexposed. 
After each five-year global stocktake¹³ 
the definitive mitigation value of foreign 
units would be established (see the 
previous section). The fund would issue 
new buyer country units corresponding 
to the mitigation value of the surrendered 
selling-country units. See Figure 3 for 
10. Aldy (2015) proposes that 
countries draw up ‘Living 
Mitigation Plans’ that 
would serve as a contin-
uously updated basis for 
expert evaluations.
11. The fund might either 
be endowed with buyer 
country units that it is 
allowed to lend, or (like a 
central bank) granted the 
permission to issue them.
12. In contrast to CERs that 
companies under the EU 
ETS were allowed to use for 
compliance up to a certain 
amount.
13. That might be one or two 
years later when all nec-
essary data and analysis is 
available.
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14. This might not be polit-
ically feasible because it 
implies the seller country 
has to give more than the 
buyer country gets, when 
the face value is actually 
greater than the mitigation 
value (which is likely to be 
the norm). Alternatively, 
both sides would use the 
mitigation value in their 
emission balances.
an illustration, in which the mitigation 
value is judged to be 7 units. At this point, 
the fund would clear the positions of the 
private buyers. If the mitigation value of 
the collateral is greater than the number 
of borrowed buyer-country units, the 
private buyer receives the unused 
collateral in terms of selling-country 
units. Should the mitigation value of 
the collateral be less than the number 
of borrowed buyer country units (as in 
Figure 4: 7 units of collateral compared 
to 8 units borrowed), the private buyer 
would have to remargin the buyer-
country units. If the buyer is unable 
to do so and defaults, the fund would 
have to bear the loss and sterilise the 
corresponding amount of units.
Figure 3: With foreign units as collateral, 
a fund lends compliance units
 
Figure 4: Fund exchanges foreign into 
domestic units; private buyers might 
have to remargin
This ensures that new buyer-country 
units created through international 
trading reflect corresponding mitigation 
in the selling country. Inflows of 
credits that do not correspond to 
actual mitigation, like those under the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism, can be prevented.
TRADE IN ACCEPTED MITIGATION 
UNITS IS MIRRORED BY STATISTICAL 
TRANSFERS
Finally the private trade between coun-
tries in emission reduction units should 
be mirrored by corresponding intergov-
ernmental transfers. The buyer country 
can use the imported mitigation value 
to comply with its NDC. And it would be 
sensible if the selling country’s emissions 
balance would increase by the face value 
of the exported units¹⁴ because this would 
provide an incentive to harmonise the 
‘face value’ and ‘mitigation value’ of units. 
Hence a transaction involving 10 
privately tradable units from the selling 
country, which are accepted as seven 
compliance units in the buyer country, 
would be mirrored by reducing the 
greenhouse gas emissions of the buyer 
country by seven tonnes and increasing 
the emissions of the selling country 
by 10 tonnes (see Figure 5 on the next 
page). In the worst case, a selling country 
could emit more than envisaged in its 
NDC. In this case, buyer countries might 
decide to respond by reducing the selling 
countries’ access to their emissions 
markets in the future. The repeated 
nature of the game – with the five-year 
stocktakes – would thereby serve as 
a commitment device, discouraging 
any selling country from deliberately 
undermining the system.
CONCLUSION
Our proposed system would allow very 
different types of emission reduction 
units to be traded between countries 
in a way that preserves the integrity of 
the Paris Agreement architecture. Every 
country would be able to issue any type 
of carbon unit in line with its own legisla-
tion, and any country would be allowed 
to accept (or not) whatever foreign unit 
is offered. The proposal is thus compar-
atively light in terms of harmonisation 
requirements.
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The two politically most difficult 
elements of our proposal are (1) the 
creation of a sufficiently large club of 
likeminded ambitious countries, and (2) 
finding an agreement on joint rules and 
institutions on the ex-post evaluation 
of the mitigation value for the tradable 
emission reduction units. But as our 
system would allow countries to opt-out 
of any type of transaction they do not like, 
and the determination of the mitigation 
value would primarily affect the private 
buyers, a sensible political compromise 
seems possible.
Such a trading system would reduce 
total mitigation costs and provide a 
backstop for countries that face rising 
emissions because of unexpected 
events¹⁵. It would also enable 
co-funding of mitigation investments 
in developing countries and encourage 
good governance of emission reduction 
systems. Companies that invest in 
low-carbon technologies in developing 
countries could, if the host countries 
have appropriate schemes in place, 
generate a part of the cash-flow for their 
investments by generating emission 
reduction units for sale to the club 
countries. This should encourage host 
countries to develop the necessary legal 
and administrative systems, including 
consistent decarbonisation strategies that 
make it easier to assess the value of their 
tradable emission reduction units.
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15. Eg the nuclear accident 
after the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake forced Japan 
to use more fossil fuels – 
making it impossible to 
achieve its emission targets 
domestically.
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Figure 5: Mirroring the private transaction in international emissions accounting
40
50
Seller country over-performs relative to its NDC
10
50
50
Buyer country fulfils its NDC
7
10 7Private transaction
ND
C 
im
pl
ie
s 
m
ax
. 1
00
Ac
tu
al
 e
m
is
si
on
s =
 9
5
Ac
tu
al
 e
m
is
si
on
s =
 1
07
ND
C 
im
pl
ie
s 
m
ax
. 1
00
International transaction
No
n-
ET
S
No
n-
ET
S
ET
S ET
S
+10
-7
